Bosnia and Herzegovina: Political Prognosis

Опубликовано на EGF: 22.10.2009

by Публикация EGF

The former-Yugoslav entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina is gripped by deep political crisis at present. Divisions between Serb, Croat and Bosniak (Bosnian Muslims) minorities are deepening inside the country, undermining the work and institutions of government, scuttling any sense of national unity and threatening to plunge Bosnia into the vortex of ethnic conflict which has already claimed the lives of more than 100,000 people during the civil war of 1992—95. Peace was secured in Bosnia in 1995 on the basis of the Dayton Accords (negotiated under the auspices of the international community), which created a new constitution and a complex system of governance, through which the country’s ethnic Bosniak, Serb and Croat minorities all retained an overriding degree of power at the expense of the federal centre. Further, the Dayton Accords de facto left Bosnia and Herzegovina as a protectorate of the international community, which retained ultimate decision making power in the country through the Office of the High Representative (OHR). The OHR, together with the presence of international peacekeepers, was envisaged by all parties as a transitional measure, however, with the objective being to facilitate constitutional reform which would strengthen Bosnia’s state institutions and systems of (central) governance, catering to the full integration of all minorities into the newly emerging Bosnian state, and paving the way for the country’s eventual entry into Euro-Atlantic institutions (ie, NATO and the EU).

In the autumn of 2009, however, it is becoming evident that the forces that seek to hold Bosnia together and aim to place it firmly onto a European path, are less resilient that those which threaten to fuel the country’s eventual disintegration. In particular, local nationalism and divisions upon ethnic lines, which wreaked havoc during the civil war of the 1990s, are now becoming more entrenched than at any time since the signing of the Dayton Accords. The political situation in Bosnia has been deteriorating throughout the course of 2009, exacerbated by a worsening social and economic environment, according to a number of sources. In April, the European Parliament, which monitors the progress of Bosnia’s reforms, reported that the situation in the country was worse than at any time since the Dayton Accords, that there is no desire (from the Bosnian minorities) to move forward (with reforms) and that the situation has never been so frustrating. The head of the European Parliament’s delegation to South-East Europe, Doris Pack, directed blame at the government of the Republic of Srpska (one of the two Federal Entities which makes up Bosnia-Herzegovina, the other being the Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina), which represents the Bosnian Serbs, for blocking reforms within the Bosnian government aimed at furthering Bosnia’s Euro-Atlantic accession prospects.

While the Bosnian Serbs, who fear majority Bosniak domination of a stronger and more unified Bosnia-Herzegovina, have long been seen as a barrier to reform in the country, at the end of August Bosnia plunged deeper into political crisis when four Croat ministers walked out of the Federation government and Bosniak leaders threatened to boycott the state government altogether. While the disagreement seemed to be over a matter of secondary priority – a government vote over changes to the route of the key Five C road corridor running through the country – it demonstrates a common pattern of events where the political representatives of the minorities are unable to find a means of working together for a common good. The Bosnian Serbs, under the leadership of Republic of Srpska Premier, Milorad Dodik, have repeatedly blocked the adoption of legislation in the Bosnian Parliament on issues such as visa free travel to the EU, border management and anti-corruption strategy. To the contrary, Dodik has become a key architect of ensuring that power remains with Bosnia’s federal entities (ie, Republic of Srpska and the Bosniak-Croat Federation) and has called for any new constitution to include the right of the Bosnian Serbs to their national self-determination (which would allow the Bosnian Serbs to secede from the political union with the Bosniaks and Croats.

This could, according to a number of sources, lead to the disintegration of Bosnia and Herzegovina and lead to violence, as Dodik, as a Serb nationalist, would most likely receive some form of support from neighbouring Belgrade (where he himself freely admits “his heart is firmly placed”). Local elections held in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the start of this month (October 5) confirmed the deepening of ethnic divisions in the country, however, as Serb, Bosniak and Croat nationalists obtained high scores in the race for mayor-ships in the country’s 149 municipalities following a campaign marked by nationalist rhetoric and lack of interest in the real problems faced by citizens. Dodik’s party, the Independent Union of Social Democrats (SNSD) was the chief benefactor of the elections in the Serbian part of the country, reportedly electing mayors in at least 32 municipalities. The nationalist Serb Democratic Party (SDS), founded by indicted war criminal, Radovan Karadzic, was the second strongest party in the Serb republic: Republika Srpska. At the time of writing, therefore, the political situation in Bosnia Herzegovina is characterized by the following:

Rising levels of (Serb and other) nationalism and constant infighting between Serb, Croat and Bosniak members of government has brought the work of state institutions to a virtual standstill. This particularly applies to the adoption of new legislation promoting political and institutional reform which the international community has hoped would strengthen the sense of national cohesion in Bosnia and Herzegovina and put the country firmly onto the path of Euro-Atlantic integration.

While a return to a fresh round of hostilities is not currently imminent in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the political situation is clearly deteriorating around newly entrenched political divisions based on ethnic and national lines. While the international community was able to broker peace in the Bosnian civil war of the 1990s, the influence it is able to extend on the country’s future political path is weakening. Reforms intended to strengthen the country’s state institutions, which are supported by the EU-US, are meeting the wrath of local political groups which are entrenched in the dissolution of power to their federal entities. This trend is likely to continue, as both the Bosnian Serb and Croat minorities are likely to be on the receiving end of patronage from Belgrade and Zagreb respectively (including the right to dual citizenship which will allow them EU entry prior to even the commencement of Bosnia’s EU accession talks). Both minorities, particularly the Serbs, are unlikely to want to live in a Bosnia and Herzegovina where Bosniaks form the political majority in state where power shifts from the entities to the federal centre (ie, under the proposed constitutional changes, the OHR would be replaced by one federally powerful president, who would most likely be Bosniak, and two vice presidents, likely to be a Serb and a Croat). Trust between Bosnia’s Bosniak, Serb and Croat political groups has all but evaporated. National elections, which are due in 2010, are likely to further reinforce this trend, which could lead to the establishment of a new legal basis for the disbandment of Bosnia and Herzegovina. With the precedent of fratricidal civil war still in recent memory, many experts and local political leaders agree that this could result in violence. Clearly, tough political decisions lie ahead for all stakeholders.

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